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Abstract 
This paper examines the long evolution of the EU’s unresolved constitution. Where the state 
is generally considered as a culturally prior, comprehensive, exclusive, monopolistic, 
singular, accomplished, determinate and settled political form and constitutional polity, the 
EU remains an accessory, partial, complementary, competitive, composite, incipient, 
indeterminate and disputed political form and constitutional polity. Over the last 15 years, as 
the relatively consensual law-centred focus of the EU’s early and ‘thin’ constitutional 
settlement has come under increasing strain, the unresolved nature of the EU constitution has 
become more palpable. In this regard, the failed Big ‘C’ constitutional project has to be seen 
as the symptom of a continuing problem rather than as some kind of 'closure' event. The 
challenge to EU constitutionalism today is to stand above the various and divisive polity 
visions with which it is often and self-defeatingly associated in the name of an expressive 
commitment to the very idea of a European common good notwithstanding these different 
polity visions. 
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The EU’s Unresolved Constitution 
 
1. Introduction: Imagining the non-State Polity in Constitutional Terms 
 
In the summer of 2007 the European Council announced its decision to “abandon” the 
“constitutional concept” it had endorsed so optimistically only four years previously on 
receiving a draft of a first Constitutional Treaty for the European Union (EU) from the 
Convention on the Future of Europe.1 After the ‘no’ votes to the 2005 French and Dutch 
referendums on the (duly promulgated) Constitutional Treaty, and in recognition of the 
document’s dubious popularity and unratified status in various other member states, Europe’s 
leaders eventually opted to jettison the brave new world of a supranational Constitution and 
return to the more familiar international law vehicle of a “Reform Treaty.”2 The move 
appeared to pay a political dividend. Agreement was reached as early as the Lisbon summit 
of December 2007 and, despite further delay occasioned by a fresh referendum defeat in 
Ireland, the new “postconstitutional Treaty”3 was successfully implemented before the end of 
2009.4  
It is a striking irony of the ultimately fatal difficulties encountered by the Convention 
project that its trials coincided with the growing acceptance of some kind of constitutional 
status for the (EU)—even if understood in “small ‘c’” rather than documentary “big ‘C’” 
terms.5 Yet this is more than coincidence. A written Constitution would not have figured on 
the European political agenda without a growing readiness to think and talk in constitutional 
terms about a process begun half a century earlier as an interwoven attempt at continental 
market-building and political rapprochement after the ravages of the Second World War.6 
And the extensive debate over the Constitutional Treaty that ensued certainly reinforced that 
trend, encouraging many interested in the EU—practitioners and commentators alike—to cast 
their appreciation of the EU’s development in constitutional language where previously they 
would had been indifferent or even hostile to such a characterization.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 German Presidency Conclusions: European Council, Brussels, 21-22 June 2007.  
2 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 01. 
3 Alexander Somek, “Postconstitutional Treaty”, (2007) 8 German Law Journal 1121-1132. 
4 See e.g. Paul Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics and Treaty Reform (2010) 
5 Neil Walker, Big “C” or Small “c”? (2006)12 European L.J. 12-14 . 
6 See e.g. Joseph Weiler The Constitution of Europe (1999) esp. ch.7. 
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The gradual adoption of a common terminology and a shared or overlapping narrative 
of constitutional origins do not, however, imply an emerging consensus about the 
contemporary constitutional quality or future constitutional potential of the EU. Rather, the 
constitutional turn has encompassed quite different and frequently opposing perspectives. 
That opposition was, of course, most apparent over the key strategic question itself—for or 
against an explicit constitutional settlement. But the big ‘C’ Constitutional debate engaged a 
deeper and wider diversity of perspectives between, within and, indeed, cutting across the 
immediate strategic alternatives.7 
 From the perspective of the big ‘C’ constitutional enthusiast, the 
(re)conceptualization of the new legal and political order as already amounting to an 
unwritten constitution supported a written Constitution on quite different grounds and to 
sharply divergent ends. The emergence of an unwritten constitution could be cited as a 
threshold of accomplishment that deserved formal recognition. On this view, a written 
constitutional settlement becomes appropriate either as a way of charting the progress or even 
according “finality”8 to the distinctive constitutional achievement of the evolved 
supranational form or, more ambitiously, as a platform from which to build on the unwritten 
constitutional acquis toward a fuller form of constitutional maturity.9 In marked contrast, the 
development of a supranational entity to a point where its powers could be claimed to be of 
constitutional weight and significance might, from a position wary of such expansion and 
minded to stress the continuing subordination of the EU to its member states, call for more 
formal constitutional recognition as a way of reining in and containing these powers.10  
From the perspective of the big ‘C’ constitutional sceptic, too, endorsement of the 
unwritten constitutional credentials of the EU supported various narratives of development. 
To highlight the peculiar progress or achievement of the informal constitutional acquis might 
suggest that a self-styled written constitutional text, far from being timely, was in fact 
redundant. More specifically, to stress the organic development and complex richness of an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For a fuller discussion of the various approaches brought to the Convention, see Neil Walker, “Europe’s 
Constitutional Momentum and the Search for Polity Legitimacy”, (2005) 3 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 211-238. 225-31 (2005) 
8 In the well-known formulation of Joschka Fischer, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
“From Confederacy to Federation—Thoughts on the finality of European integration”. Speech at the Humboldt 
University in Berlin on 12 May 2000. This speech is widely credited as a key moment in the mobilization of 
political opinion in favour of a big ‘C’ constitutional process. 
9 See e.g. Jürgen Habermas, “Why Europe needs a Constitution” (2001) 11 New Left Review 5  
10 See e.g. The Economist, Nov 4 2000. The conversion of the notoriously Euro-sceptic magazine to the case 
for a written Constitution was contingent upon such a limiting approach. 
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unprecedented supranational accommodation of legal and political forces might indicate the 
intrinsic difficulty, even inappropriateness, of any attempt to reduce that accommodation to a 
single self-contained documentary Constitution.11 Or, in a more uncompromising variation of 
the sceptical theme, resort to constitutional language might serve to dramatize and accentuate 
the gap between those modest aspects of constitutionalism suited to the supranational domain 
and those grander aspirations and accomplishments familiar from the state tradition, so 
accentuating the deep incongruence—or “category error”12—of a fully-fledged written 
Constitution in this new domain.  
The relationship between endorsement of the unwritten constitutional credentials of 
the EU and position-taking in the strategic context of the documentary constitutional debate, 
then, is complex, much dependent on the overall approach to the EU polity espoused or 
assumed. We may usefully re-plot this complexity, therefore, in terms of a spectrum of 
ambition encompassing three main polity visions. At the modest end of the spectrum, the EU 
polity assumes a truncated form, as something which in constitutional terms is measurable 
against but emphatically less than statehood. The EU as a polity-lite possessing only the more 
elementary features of statehood is seen either as attracting a constitutionalism-lite which 
does not merit the imprimatur of a written expression, or, if such a written form is 
contemplated, as it was by Euro-sceptic opinion during the heights of debate over the 
documentary constitution, it is so only to curb the state-like ambitions or tendencies of the 
supranational polity. In a complex middle ground, the EU is seen as a distinct and sui generis 
work-in-progress or achievement, one whose development and accompanying constitutional 
narrative clearly diverges from the state model. Again, this vision may or may not be deemed 
to be appropriately served by a written constitution, in this case depending upon whether one 
stresses its expressive value as a vindication of supranational distinctiveness or the excessive 
rigidity or irrelevance of its fixed form in the face of the moving picture of European 
integration. Finally, at the most ambitious end of the spectrum, the state again become the 
direct point of comparison, but no longer is viewed as a necessarily higher constitutional 
form than the EU. Rather, constitutionalization is seen as a foundation and point of departure 
for a fuller form of realization of the EU polity, if not as a state, at least as a meaningfully 
state-analogous entity in terms of certain key indices of polity formation and maturation; an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See e.g. Joseph Weiler, “In defence of the status quo. Europe’s Constitutional Sonderweg”, in Joseph Weiler 
and Marlene Wind (eds.), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (2003); Stephen Weatherill, “Is 
constitutional finality feasible or desirable? On the case for European constitutionalism and a European 
Constitution” Conweb 7/2002.  
12 See e.g. Andrew Moravcsik, “A Category Error” Prospect July 2005, 22-26. 
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ambition which, at least in the dominant modern constitutional tradition, has been seen to 
require a documentary expression. 
 We will return to these different polity visions—truncated and derivative polity, 
polity sui generis and mature polity—and how they might inform ongoing or renewed debate 
on Europe’s constitutional future in the concluding Section of this Chapter. The immediate 
point of these initial observations is simply to show how widespread and, simultaneously, 
how volatile the language of constitutionalism has become in today’s EU. Our main focus in 
what follows is upon the ‘raw material’ from which the various contemporary readings of 
Europe’s constitutional achievement and potential are drawn. We pose the baseline question 
of the very possibility of a constitutional law for the EU—a question that all positions in 
favour of a constitution, whether written or unwritten, are bound to answer affirmatively. 
Given the types of things that the idea of constitutional law tends to signify and, given where 
constitutional law is situated and how it is distributed across our global maps of legal 
meaning and authority, to what extent and in what ways is it possible to conceive of the EU 
as a suitable constitutional site? This inquiry requires us, first, to consider the EU against a 
general background of constitutional imagination and definition. In so doing, we explain why 
our understanding of the EU is much influenced by the historic centrality of the modern state 
to constitutional theory and practice, but also why, in these inescapable but incomplete terms, 
the EU is an unresolved constitutional entity. We then consider how the EU’s putatively 
constitutional features have in practice emerged and unfolded, in so doing focusing on the 
centrality of law to this process. And as this centrality has come under pressure in the mature 
EU, we consider, finally, the changing constitutional challenges and opportunities of this new 
species of post-state polity. 
  
2. The Possibility of European Union Constitutional Law 
 A In the shadow of the state; the specific, the relational and the general 
Within our contemporary conceptual maps of legal authority and meaning there are three 
different modes in which we recognize and according to which we situate constitutional law. 
Each mode figures in at least some understandings of the constitutional credentials of the EU. 
First, and still emphatically foremost, as indicated by the tenor of debate over a big ‘C’ 
Constitution, we typically view constitutional law as polity-specific. We comprehend 
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constitutional law as rooted in, peculiar to, concentrated upon and, most fundamentally, as in 
significant ways ‘constitutive’ and configurative of a particular polity or political 
community—as providing a unique regulatory frame that embraces and contains the whole 
polity. Today, however, the polity-specific perspective far from exhausts our understanding 
of constitutionalism. Where in the high modern age constitutional law was the primary law 
internal to states and international law was the dominant law between such mutually 
exclusive constitutional polities, that neat demarcation no longer holds. With the rise of non-
state polities, including the EU itself, which overlap and intersect other polities, including 
state polities, as an outgrowth of the first polity-specific mode we increasingly also 
understand constitutional law in relational terms, as a nexus connecting different polities and 
their polity-specific systems of constitutional law. This altered institutional and constitutional 
landscape is part and parcel of the intensified wave of globalization or transnationalisation of 
the key circuits of social, economic and political power we have witnessed since the second 
half of the 20th century.13 Thirdly, there is also a way of viewing constitutional law as polity-
indifferent; neither as dedicated to a particular polity, nor even as located at the interface 
between particular polities, but as mobile between or otherwise recurrent across a wide range 
of polities. In this mode, which in a further feature of the globalizing trend has also become 
more salient in recent years, constitutional law, perhaps most prominently in the area of 
individual rights, may be perceived as a floating category of discrete or only loosely 
aggregated legal phenomena which have a universal or at least more general moral or 
practical resonance regardless of polity location.14  
Common to all three modes of constitutional law is the heavy imprint of the modern 
state. This is most emphatically so of the first and dominant mode. The paradigm case of 
polity-specific constitutional law is the constitutional law of the state polity. The very form in 
which we view constitutional law in this mode, as something discrete and delimited, follows 
the model of the modern state. Equally, how we understand constitutional rules and 
mechanisms in this polity-specific form as typically co-designed or co-evolved in a holistic 
fashion—as the ‘joined-up’ normative patterning of political life—is exemplified by and 
largely sustained by the modern state tradition. Further, the detailed content of constitutional 
rules appropriate to the form of the discrete and joined-up polity are also much influenced by 
the long state tradition of usage and development. Constitutional law in relational mode, too, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See e.g. A. Jones, Globalization: Key Thinkers ( 2010). 
14 See e.g. Lorraine Weinrib, The Postwar Paradigm and American exceptionalism in S. Choudhry(ed) The 
Migration of Constitutional Ideas (2006) 84-105. 
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remains strongly under the influence of the state tradition, since the leading players remain 
the states themselves, and the constitutional pedigree and character of these state players will 
inevitably affect closely the terms of inter-polity relations. Finally, even where we consider 
constitutional law as non-polity-specific and non-holistic, but as a set of discrete and 
increasingly mobile rules, their meaning and migratory course remains conditioned by the 
various polity setting in which they are received and adapted, and the historically most 
significant and still most prominent such polity settings remain states. 
B The ambivalent legacy of state constitutionalism 
 The powerful legacy of state constitutionalism has decidedly mixed implications for 
the EU. Through the power of example the state tradition has encouraged and shaped the 
constitutional credentials of the EU more than it has any other non-state polity. The state 
tradition provides both a cue for recognizing and a template for developing the EU as a 
discrete and joined-up polity. In addition, as we shall see, much of the detailed content of the 
structures and doctrines of EU constitutional law is adapted from state constitutional law. 
 Yet the prominence of the statist heritage also challenges our understanding of the 
EU in constitutional terms. It does so both conceptually and practically. Conceptually, despite 
a strong family resemblance in some features, the EU is not a state. Although it may seek to 
develop functional equivalents, it lacks the crucial aspects of exclusivity of final authority, 
originality of collective agency and primacy of political identity associated with the mature 
constitutional character of the state, most emphatically in the high modern phase of the global 
system of states. Exclusivity of authority refers to the classical notion of state sovereignty. It 
holds that the state exhibits the one supreme ordering authority for a certain territorial 
polity—an authority that defers to no internal or external authority and to which all other 
authorities must defer. Originality of collective agency refers to the idea of such state 
sovereignty as the product of an irreducible pouvoir constituant or constituent power—a 
power residing in ‘the people’ conceived of as a non-derivative and unencumbered source. 
Primacy of political identity refers to a deep aspect of political culture—to the idea that the 
governing political persona of the subject is citizenship of the state polity, and that such 
citizenship announces the general associative bond through which particular political 
interests and beliefs are articulated and negotiated and other commitments and loyalties are 
circumscribed.  
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Practically, the key reason why the EU does not and cannot possess these statist 
features of authority, agency and identity, or at least cannot in the fullest sense associated 
with modern statehood, is precisely because it must exist alongside and in relation to states. 
While states themselves are undoubtedly challenged, altered and somewhat diluted in their 
constitutional character by the rise of non-state polities such as the EU in the late modern 
phase of globalization, they still in some measure continue to claim these scarce and 
competitive attributes for themselves.  
To appreciate the EU in constitutional terms, therefore, we must look both to and 
beyond the template of the state. We look to the state for what the EU can adopt or adapt. As 
we have seen from the big ‘C’ constitutional debate, this is a sharply divisive move. It can be 
made more or less modestly, depending on the underlying polity vision held, and on the 
extent to which functional equivalents to the state’s mature constitutional aspects are 
considered feasible or desirable. And we must also be prepared to look beyond the state for 
those ‘constitutional’ features that are not based upon the state model and cannot be 
considered their functional equivalent. In so doing, let us concentrate on the first and, by 
extension, the second mode for thinking about the constitutional credentials of the EU, both 
of which are premised on the idea of constitutional law as a polity-specific practice, while 
remaining mindful of the third, polity-indifferent, way of thinking about constitutionalism.  
C Framing the Modern Constitutional Polity 
The still dominant idea of constitutional law as polity-specific predates the modern state, 
even if the modern state has provided its (re)defining vehicle in recent centuries. Originating 
in the Latin verb constituere (to establish) and its associated noun constitutio, and in a cluster 
of similar predecessor notions in Ancient Greece, the concept of constitution was gradually 
extended from the natural world to the world of the ‘body politic’,15 first of the classical 
republics and then through various fuller incarnations of the state. As already intimated, the 
term constitution implies a discrete and holistic entity as the framed object of ‘constitutional’ 
reference and contemplation. There are, two distinct aspects and two steps within this 
framing logic, and the movement from one to the other describes the emergence of modern 
constitutionalism. First, the mediaeval and early modern idea of constitution as an embracing 
descriptor of the inherited polity reflects a deepening assumption and spreading recognition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See e.g. Dieter Grimm, “The Constitution in the Process of Denationalization”, (2005)12 Constellations 447-
463  
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that political society is appropriately situated and concentrated within certain stable and 
territorially-coded containers of social space. Secondly, and crucially, in the age of the 
modern state this idea gradually assumes a more constructive and a more progressive hue. 
The constitution is no longer simply an acknowledgement and expression of the established 
and embedded order of things within the “imagined”16 setting of the bounded polity. Rather, 
it is now a constructive achievement. It is an active project of collective self-organisation, 
pursued in the interests—and eventually in the name—of that collective, of a polity 
conceived of as a community of free and equal persons. As such, it contains an enabling and 
a constraining element, concerned both to ensure the effective pursuit of the collective 
interests and to protect certain basic rights and freedoms of the free and equal individuals and 
groups who make up that community.17  
The mechanics of this are complex. The new constructive constitution seeks, through 
various interlocking framing registers, to establish the wherewithal necessary to shape and 
sustain the imagined political community. What does the pattern of interlocking framing 
registers consist of? Basically, constitutional thought in the modern state tradition develops a 
set of distinctions but also a dense web of connections between a legal or normative framing 
register and other registers, which we may categorize as political and socio-cultural. The 
concentrated treatment of collective action problems and possibilities within any polity 
requires, in the first place, an appropriate normative blueprint. The normative register, in 
turn, divides into various sub-registers. There is a formal sub-register, consisting of the 
building blocks through which an autonomous and integrated legal system forms and equips 
itself with a normative capacity fit for modern constitutional purpose. There is also a 
jurisdictional sub-register, referring to the substantive scope of the legal order—the positive 
and negative means by which it specifies the boundaries of its competence. And there is, 
finally, an integrative sub-register, referring to how the formally connected bones of an 
expansively scoped legal system flesh out and cohere as an organic whole. 
 In the second place, the state constitutional order requires an authoritative 
assemblage of dedicated political institutions, itself generated or recognized by that 
normative order, as the complex of public power that acts upon, secures and further develops 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See e.g. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism 
(2006) 
17 See e.g. Mattias Kumm, “The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between 
Constitutionalism in and beyond the State” in J. L. Dunoff and J.P. Trachtman (eds) Ruling the World? 
Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance ( 2009) 258-325. 
 
University of Edinburgh School of Law Working Paper 2011/15 
Page 9 of 33	  
that normative order.18 We can again identify clear sub-registers within the political register. 
There is, on the one hand, the institutional sub-register, referring to the architecture of 
government itself—to the combination and organization of legislative, executive, judicial and 
administrative branches through which the normative order is activated and renewed. There 
is, on the other hand, the authorizing sub-register, referring to the expression and 
operationalization of the distinctively modern idea of the normative and institutional 
constitution as an artefact—as something shaped through collective human agency. It denotes 
the constituency by which and the way in which, in that constituency’s own terms, the 
constitutional order is initiated and constructed, or at least appropriated as an active 
constitutional order. This authorization may be a process or an event, informal or formal, elite 
or popular, but in the mature modern model of “foundational constitutionalism”19 the 
institution of the constitutional order is typically conceived of as occurring through a formal 
episode of inclusive self-legislation—a popularly authorized project of documentary 
constitution-making. In the third place, there is a socio-cultural register. This requires an 
associative field—in its more developed forms variously called a society, a people, a 
community, a demos—as the cultural resource that energizes and sustains and is in turn 
fertilized by the mutually supportive legal and political orders.20 
 Because our sense of a modern constitutional order depends upon the interlocking 
combination of these framing registers, our threshold definition requires a minimum level of 
‘activity’ within each field. There must be some basic evidence of expansive and integrating 
legal order and of a self-authorized rather than a merely inherited or imposed institutional 
apparatus, and there must be some level of broad cultural recognition and endorsement of the 
constitutional artefact. Beyond that threshold, we can distinguish between more or less 
intense achievements of constitutionalism as an active project of collective self-legislation. 
An autonomous legal order and dedicated architecture of political institutions provide the 
‘thin’ essentials of any constitutional construction, including any candidate for 
constitutionalism beyond the state. A fuller set of links, involving a more significant 
investment in the expansive jurisdictional and integrative dimensions of the normative 
register, in the authorizing dimension of the political register and in the associative bonds 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See e.g. Niklas Luhmann, Das Recht Der Gesellschaft ( 1993). 
19 Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: the pluralist structure of postnational law (2010) ch.2 
20 See e.g. Dieter Grimm, “Integration by Constitution” (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 
193-208. 
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available under the socio-cultural register, becomes necessary for a ‘thicker’ constitutional 
settlement.21  
 It is with reference to this fuller set of links that we comprehend the mature anatomy 
of state constitutionalism. The combination of fully developed legal, political and socio-
cultural framing registers maps on to the three ‘peaks’ of exclusive final authority, original 
collective agency and primary political identity. In constitutional terms, exclusive final 
authority is a function of the interlocking of a formally autonomous legal order, a 
jurisdictional range unchallenged and unfettered by any other authority and a dedicated set of 
authoritative political institutions. Original collective agency is a function of an 
acknowledged act or process of self-authorization by which the constituent power generates 
these sovereign legal and political institutions or assumes ownership of them. Primacy of 
political identity depends upon a symbiosis of culture and of legal and political structure. It 
requires a sufficient sense of common political bond at the socio-cultural level to provide 
support for and sustained recognition of these sovereign legal and political institutions as 
duly self-authorized, including the act or process of self-authorization itself, which 
institutional accomplishment and event history may in turn reinforce the common bond of 
citizenship.22 
D. Distinguishing EU constitutionalism; The Unresolved Constitution 
Much analysis of the constitutional quality of the European Union polity follows the 
general track of this conventional approach. Such is the relative novelty of the subject at 
supranational level, indeed, that this literature often pays more attention to the basic idea of 
constitutional framing than is typically so in the more taken-for-granted world of state 
constitutionalism on which that conceptual structure is so closely modelled. Before 
examining the detailed trajectory of EU constitutional development in these terms, however, 
we should indicate the broad underlying differences between the EU and the state context. As 
already remarked, for all the discrete and holistic properties of the EU polity, it lacks those 
very traditionally state-defining features of exclusive final authority, original collective 
agency and primary political identity that provide the fullest articulation of the constitutional 
model of interlocking legal, political and socio-cultural frames available to us. Considered in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See e.g. Miguel Maduro, “The Importance of Being Called a Constitution; Constitutional Authority and the 
Authority of Constitutionalism” (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 332-356. 
22 See e.g. Dieter Grimm “The Achievement of Constitutionalism and its Prospects in a Changed World” in P. 
Dobner and M. Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of Constitutionalism?(2010) 3-22. 
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the terms dictated by the statist template, then, the EU has operated at the ‘thinner’ end of the 
spectrum of constitutional development. Yet the absence of certain statist features is also a 
space of constitutional possibility. The EU increasingly utilizes many of the tools and much 
of the vocabulary of constitutionalism in ways that explore new and often contested horizons 
of political meaning and authority and which employ or imply alternative polity visions. 
There is, in short, something open-ended and fundamentally unresolved about the EU’s 
constitutional formation, and this is demonstrated in a number of more specific elements of 
absence, openness or special development.  
First, there is the basic matter of the more restricted depth and breadth of the polity 
horizon. The intensity achievable through the high modern state in terms of its three peaks of 
sovereignty, constituent power and citizenship implies a claim to be source and container of 
collective action for a political community which is only self-limiting in its jurisdictional 
reach, asserts comprehensive normative capacity to deliver within that range, and provides 
the primary frame of reference for its members. This is reflected in the closely self-referential 
character of the state’s constitutional posture—in its self-orientation as a comprehensively 
self-sufficient and culturally prior form of political organization. In comparison, the EU 
possesses both a narrower competence and a less comprehensive normative capacity within 
that narrower competence, as well as a supplementary status in terms of political identity. 
That is to say, it invokes a jurisdiction that is only partial both in scope and in effective 
capacity and it involves a way of political being that is culturally secondary and accessory to 
that of state citizenship.  
This more restricted and more crowded horizon, in turn, has implications for how the 
EU relates to other polities. Whereas the only self-limiting state polity treats other polities 
either as mere delegates or as its (mutually exclusive) fully sovereign counterparts, the partial 
EU polity is also perforce a polity whose jurisdiction and capacity may, from one 
perspective, overlap the boundaries of other polities, and, from another even more fluid 
perspective, represent the ‘crowded space’ or point of intersection of various different 
polities. These two perspectives upon the situation and spatialisation of the EU polity—
‘inside-out’ boundary overlap and ‘outside-in’ interlocking—indicate three further 
distinguishing features of the EU as an unresolved constitutional polity. The first perspective 
accounts for two contrasting features of the EU’s open and overlapping boundaries. On the 
one hand, as a limited polity in terms of scope and capacity, the EU’s orientation towards 
states and other polities is often that of a collaborative and complementary polity, seeking 
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through a complex of inter-systemic normative “bridging mechanisms”23 to co-ordinate its 
objectives and its means for realizing its objectives with these other polities. On the other 
hand, the shift from self-reference to external reference also has a negative connotation, and 
again the contrast with the system of states is marked. The exclusively empowered and self-
sufficient state treats its authority, and the authority of other exclusively empowered and 
self–sufficient states, in monopolistic terms. For its part, given its extensive overlap with 
other polities, primarily state polities, alongside and in tension with its collaborative approach 
to these other polities, the EU also finds itself in a competitive relationship with these same 
polities over their respective domains of authority.  
 The situation is further complicated by the third relational dimension of the EU 
polity, where the logic of polity interpenetration is taken a stage further and the environment 
of polity diversity is understood not just to affect the margins of the EU polity but to shape its 
very internal composition. Whereas the comprehensively and exclusively authorized state 
polity necessarily possesses structural integrity or singularity, in which not just all normative 
elements but also all institutional parts contribute to and are resolved in terms of one and the 
same polity whole (even if their initial point of reference may be different territorial, ethnic 
or functional parts), the EU may instead be viewed as a composite entity. It is a hybrid—a 
“mixed”24 or “compound”25 structure—which in its different institutions (Council, European 
Council, Commission, Parliament, Court) and normative emphases reflects and interlocks its 
differently polity-sourced parts.  
Alongside these three spatial features of the constitutional particularity of the EU 
there are two distinguishing temporal features. Although their resilience is highly variable26 
and their causal sequence of development can vary dramatically—from the United States 
model in which the self-authorizing constitutional instrument predates the cultural 
construction of ‘national’ community and the political architecture of the state to various 
European continental models where either or both ‘state’ and ‘nation’ predate the explicitly 
constitutional project27—we encounter and contemplate the vast majority of enduring state 
constitutions as achieved states of affairs. We typically confront them as always/already 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Steve Weatherill, Law and Integration in the European Union (1995) chs 4- 5.  
24 See e.g. Giandomenico Majone, “Delegation of Regulatory Powers in a Mixed Polity” (2002) 8 European 
Law Journal 319; N MacCormick Questioning Sovereignty (1999) ch. 9. 
25 S. Fabbrini, Compound Democracies: Why the United States and Europe Are Becoming 
Similar (2007). 
26 See e.g. Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, James Melton, T he Endurance of National Constitutions (2009). 
27 See M. Rosenfeld, The Identity of the Constitutional Subject: Selfhood, Citizenship, Culture and Community 
(2010) chs 5-7. 
University of Edinburgh School of Law Working Paper 2011/15 
Page 13 of 33	  
‘thickly’ accomplished projects whose dynamic is one of consolidation or adaptation. This is 
not the case with the EU. Whether or not its future development is envisaged in state-
analogous terms, the EU today remains a constitutional work in progress—an incipient 
structure still self-consciously under construction rather than a fully realized form. Moreover, 
and closely related, the EU’s unresolved condition is not just empirical but also conceptual. 
Whereas the completeness of the state constitutional model presupposes a recognizable 
template for its mature form, and so a determinacy and finality of conception, the 
incompleteness of the EU in these state-centred terms and its irreducibility to these state-
centred terms suggests the absence of any such settled model of its mature form—an 
indeterminacy and open-endedness of conception. 
A final distinctive characteristic of EU constitutionalism flows from the previous 
features. The state constitutional polity, on the one hand, is a settled political form. Such is its 
embeddedness, self-sufficiency, self-containment and structural unity, its typical 
manifestation as an already accomplished state and conformity to a familiar template, that 
neither its basic eligibility as a constitutional polity nor the general terms on which that 
eligibility depends are the subject of serious contestation. That does not mean that the basic 
status qua constitutional state claimed on behalf of a polity will not be challenged. Either the 
very identity of the state or, more commonly, its satisfaction of basic constitutional standards 
may be contested, both externally and internally. But however sharply engaged, the contest 
remains one about specific cases rather than the general type. The constitutional polity of the 
EU, on the other hand, is a constitutionally disputed polity. In light of its limited jurisdiction, 
its secondary form of political identity and agency, its open and unsettled relationship with 
states and other polities, its hybrid structure, its still emergent status and provisional 
conception, both its basic eligibility as a constitutional polity and the terms on which that 
eligibility rest are subject to serious and continuing contestation. 
In a nutshell, whereas the state has generally been considered as a culturally prior, 
comprehensive, exclusive, monopolistic, singular, accomplished, determinate and settled 
political form and constitutional polity, the EU remains an accessory, partial, complementary, 
competitive, composite, incipient, indeterminate and disputed political form and 
constitutional polity.  
3. The Trajectory of EU Constitutionalism 
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Let us cash out this preliminary conceptual analysis through an examination of the evolving 
terms of the EU’s unresolved constitutionalism. In so doing, we focus on these predominantly 
legal sub-registers within which emerged, largely unheralded in these terms at the time, what 
has subsequently been consecrated as the ‘thin’ version of EU constitutionalism. Having 
described that achievement, we will consider its strengths and limitation, and why it has 
come under increased scrutiny and pressure in the lead-up to the big ‘C’ Constitutional 
project. 
A. The element of ‘thin’ constitutionalism 
(i) The formal sub-register 
 The birth of small ‘c’ constitutionalism in the EU context is closely associated with the 
elaboration of the formal sub-register of legal order. As noted earlier, this involves a cluster 
of interconnected features that supply the basic structure of a self-standing legal system.. 
Self-ordering refers to the capacity of a legal system to reach and regulate all matters within 
its domain, typically through its successful embedding of certain law-making ‘secondary’ 
norms as a means to generate and validate a comprehensive body of ‘primary’ norms of 
conduct,28 which norms may themselves may be further distinguished as higher or lower, 
more or less binding and entrenched. Self-interpretation refers to the capacity of some 
organ(s) internal to the legal order, typically located in the adjudicative branch, to have the 
final word as regards the meaning and purpose of its own norms. Self-extension refers to the 
capacity of a legal system to determine the extent of its own jurisdiction—sometimes known 
as Kompetenz-Kompetenz. Self-amendment refers to the existence of a mechanism for 
changing the content of the legal order that is provided for in terms of that order and 
empowers organs internal to that order as the agents of the amendment process. Self-
enforcement refers to the capacity of the legal order, through the development of a body of 
procedural law and associated sanctions, to secure the application and implementation of its 
own norms.  
Finally, the quality of self-discipline depends on the platform established by these 
other features. When the legal order reaches a certain threshold of coverage and constancy in 
its production of primary norms (self-ordering), when it attains a certain threshold of 
effectiveness in its rules of standing, justiciability and liability (self-enforcement), when it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 H. L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd ed., 1997 ) ch.5 
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acquires some capacity to adjust or refine its own normative structure, and provided it can 
guard against external influences undermining these system-building endeavours (self-
amendment, self-interpretation and self-extension), it is then in a formal position (though far 
from guaranteed) to satisfy two related aspects of self-discipline. First, it can offer a level of 
generality and predictability of treatment of those subject to its norms, so helping to promote 
and vindicate a system-constraining cultural presumption against arbitrary rule. Secondly, 
and more specifically, the consolidation of a legal order with mature claims to autonomy, 
comprehensive coverage and effectiveness provides the opportunity and cultivates the 
expectation that even the institutional or governmental actors internal to the legal order 
should not escape the discipline of legal restraint in accordance with that mature order. These 
two core ideas—of the ‘rule of law, not man’ and of a ‘government limited by law’,29—
provide a key element of all Western legal traditions, whether couched in the language of 
‘rule of law’, état de droit or Rechtstaat, and supply a cornerstone of constitutionalism 
understood as a discourse not just of legal authority but also of legal virtue. 30 
From its inception in the three founding Treaties of the 1950s,31 the EU legal order, 
through a mix of legislative provision and judicial assertion, boasted many of the formal 
features of a self-standing legal order. Its development, however, has also been conditioned 
by its ‘spatial’ situation as an overlapping polity in a relationship of mutual dependence and 
competition with state polities. The EU both invites and depends upon the cooperation and is 
vulnerable to the self-assertion of other legal orders within a broader ‘pluralist’ 
configuration,32 and so its formal autonomy is coloured and modified both by collaborative 
openness and of boundary rivalry. 
 In terms of self-ordering and self-interpretation the EU legal order comes closest to a 
fully self-contained system. Its founding Treaties provides the EU’s own internal hierarchy of 
normative instruments—Treaty provisions, directives, regulations and decisions,33 and this 
framework has been progressively adjusted and rationalized over subsequent Treaties.34 For 
its part, from its pivotal early assertion of the ‘supremacy’ or ‘primacy’ of its norms in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See e.g. Brian Tamanaha, On The Rule of Law ( 2004) ch.9. 
30 See e.g. Neil Walker, “Opening or Closure? The Constitutional Intimations of the ECJ”, in Miguel Maduro 
and Loic Azoulai (eds.) The Past and Future of EU Law (2010) 333-342. 
31 The European Coal and Steel Community of 1951, the Euratom Treaty of 1957, and most importantly, the 
European Economic Community Treaty of the same year. 
32 The literature on so-called constitutional pluralism in the EU is now extensive. For an excellent overview, 
see Monica Claes, The National Courts’ Mandate in the European Constitution (2006)  
33 Art. 189 EEC.  
34 See now, Art. 249 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  
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general over the norms of other legal systems,35 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has long 
ensured that, from the internal perspective of the EU legal order at least, that hierarchy 
prevails over the competing ordering claims of other legal systems. This and other early acts 
act of self-assertion in the formative years of its jurisprudence helped the ECJ to consolidate 
its position, suggested but not determined by the framework provisions of the Treaties, as a 
‘Supreme Court’ for the EU, and so as its final interpretive authority.36 But even in these 
areas of greatest strength, supranational authority is qualified at the margins. Dependence 
upon national instruments for implementation of EU legislatives measure other than 
regulations curtails the self-ordering chain of validity. Additionally, as the ECJ’s main 
jurisdiction is by means of preliminary reference to obtain authoritative resolution of 
questions as to the interpretation or validity of EU law,37 and so within the referring gift and 
subject to the disposal of the domestic referring court, it is not a final appellate court. It lacks 
the capacity to have the last word, including the very means to ‘decide what to decide’.  
While still well developed in comparison to other transnational regimes, other aspects 
of the formal autonomy of the EU are more significantly qualified. As regards self-extension, 
through the doctrine of implied powers and an expansive reading of its own ‘necessary and 
proper’ clause,38 the ECJ court makes serious claim to determine the range of its own 
competence. In the final analysis, however, this is limited by the EU’s dependence upon 
(textually) conferred powers.39 It is also counterbalanced by the preparedness of the domestic 
courts of Germany, Spain, Denmark, Poland, the Czech Republic and elsewhere40 to 
(re)assert national constitutional authority from time to time against what they see as the 
actual or potential overreach of the European legal order. This claimed overreach may 
involve Treaty powers which encroach too far on core and traditional areas of state 
sovereignty,41 or it may involve supranational legislative acts or executive powers deemed to 
interfere with fundamental rights42 or other national constitutional protections.43 In any event, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
36 See e.g. Alec Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe (2004). 
37 Art. 267 TFEU  
38 Art. 352 TFEU.  
39 Art. 5 TEU.  
40 See e.g. J. Baquero Cruz, “The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement” (2008) 14 
European Law Journal 389; W. Sadurski “Solange Chapter 3; Constitutional Courts in Central Europe—
democracy—European Union” (2008) 14 European Law Journal 1-35. 
41 Often in the context of Treaty reform, as in the German Constitutional Court’s famous judgments on the 
legality of the Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties; See e.g. Brunner v. European Union Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR 57; 
Judgment of 30 June 2009 (2 BvE 2 / 08, 5 / 08; 2 BvR 1010 / 08, 1022 / 08, 1259 / 08, 182 / 09).  
42 See e.g. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel 
[1974] 2 CMLR 540 
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the fact or prospect of such reactions may invite a more prudent approach by the judicial and 
other branches of the EU when addressing the range and limits of their jurisdictional 
ambition.44 
Outside the generous limits of self-interpretation, the power of constitutional self-
amendment, strictly construed, remains lacking. Instead, the EU legal order relies upon a 
mechanism external to its own institutional edifice—namely the Intergovernmental 
Conference—for formal Treaty amendment. In a significant concession, however, recent 
Treaties have introduced simplified and less onerous non-Treaty based procedures for the 
revision of some of their own terms.45 In the area of self-enforceability, a key element has 
been the doctrine of the ‘direct effect’ of EU norms in national legal orders, which developed 
and continues to operate in close tandem with the primacy doctrine.46 Yet even within the 
limited set of those supranational rules considered sufficiently clear, precise and 
unconditional to be domestically justiciable, the co-operation of national judges is patently 
necessary for enforcement. And beyond this, the EU legal order depends upon national 
authorities both for the legislative transposition and for the executive and (again) judicial 
application of non-directly effective norms, although the gradual expansion by the ECJ of the 
doctrine of state liability47 as a way of plugging the gaps in this system has been a selectively 
effective sanction against non-compliance.  
Finally, self-discipline presents another picture of significant yet incomplete 
authority. The idea of the ‘rule of law’ applying comprehensively to the institutions of the EU 
itself, was elevated to the litmus test and standard of constitutionality by the ECJ when it 
coined the small ‘c’ word in Les Verts48 to justify the non-Treaty addition of the Parliament 
to the list of bodies subject to judicial review. However, the ambition of comprehensive 
internal legal oversight has remained vulnerable to the non-justiciability or limited 
justiciability of certain areas of EU law, notably, despite recent improvements, in the newer, 
non-core domains of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy.49 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 See e.g. the recent cluster of cases challenging the constitutionality of the European Arrest Warrant, 
discussed in Cruz, n40 above.  
44 See, Weiler n6 above, 320 (discussing the relevance of the logic of Mutually Assured Destruction) 
45 Art.48(6-7) TEU. 
46 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1. 
47 See e.g. Case C-224/01 Kobler v Austria [2003] ECR I-10239. 
48 Case 294/83 Parti Ecologiste (‘Les Verts’) v. European Parliament [ [1986] ECR 1339; [1987] 2 CMLR 
343; For discussion, see Walker, n30 above. 
49 Arts. 275-76 TFEU. 
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(ii) The jurisdictional sub-register 
The other normative sub-registers have gradually built on the platform of formal autonomy. 
Jurisdiction has assumed a highly distinctive shape in the EU. In the state constitutional 
context the jurisdictional sub-register closely reflects and tracks the defining modern 
constitutional idea of a broad division between a collectively-enabling public sphere of 
comprehensive policy capacity and a collectively-constraining protected sphere of private 
autonomy. Typically, we find a combination of positive and negative norms—of prescription 
and proscription. On the one hand, there is a functionally unlimited legislative and executive 
jurisdiction in pursuit of the common good, while on the other, that jurisdiction is curtailed 
and circumscribed by a set of individual-centred ‘forbearance’ rights or basic freedoms.  
In the EU, both collective competence and individual freedoms have been treated 
differently, as has the relationship between them. Collective competence is not functionally 
unlimited. What is more, it is a competence that is defined not against but in terms of the 
‘functional’ pursuit of a particular sub-set of individual freedoms, namely the so-called ‘four 
freedoms’ of movement of goods, services, capital and persons necessary to secure a 
common transnational market. The common good and individual freedom, therefore, are 
treated not as distinct, sometimes divergent and mutually balancing ends but as indistinct and 
convergent, if self-limiting objectives. And reflecting the new relational openness of the EU 
polity context, the constraining edge of this jurisdiction is for the most part externally 
directed, towards the member states in the form of prohibitions upon the maintenance or 
introduction of national measures constituting barriers to trade, creating other obstacles to 
free and undistorted competition,50 or impeding the free movement of persons, services and 
capital.51 For the “market-making” pursuit of the four freedoms by the EU is largely through 
the method commonly known as “negative integration”,52 with the ECJ and the Commission 
enabling through constraining—by means of specifying and policing the permissive 
boundaries of the market against state encroachment. 
If this paints a jurisdictional picture sharply at odds with the state constitutional 
model, other developments have begun to suggest a more familiar pattern. First, the 
functional jurisdiction of the EU has also gradually come to be pursued through “positive 
integration”, namely the elaboration by legislative and other measures of a system of 
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regulation at the level of the larger supranational unit.53 To some extent, this has remained 
concerned with market–making—for example, the harmonization of divergent national 
product standards. In addition, however, and accelerating from the time of the Single 
European Act (1987) and the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), the increase in positive integration 
tracks the expansion of EU jurisdiction beyond the four freedoms into various “market-
correcting” provisions of social and environmental regulation as well as other flanking 
measures, primarily in internal and external security, which owe little to the economic 
rationale of integration and more to other kinds of collective policy capacity associated with 
the state.54 The reasons for this and its significant implications for the stability of the ‘thin’ 
constitutional settlement are considered further below.55  
 A second and more recent state-like jurisdictional development addresses the other 
side of the coin. It concerns the informal adoption in 2000 and eventual Treaty recognition of 
the wide-ranging Charter of Fundamental Rights.56 Applicable against both member states 
and the EU’s own institutions and other bodies, this initiative, in pursuing the idea of a 
general constitutional protection of private autonomy, has meant that, on the proscriptive as 
well as the prescriptive side, EU jurisdiction more closely approximates the domestic model. 
 
(iii) The integrative sub-register 
The integrative sub-register provides the most explicit example within the supranational 
normative register of direct borrowing from the domestic constitutional heritage. At issue 
here is how the mix of European law becomes gradually thickened to fill in the gaps left by 
the purely mechanical coherence of the formal model. Through the idea of general principles 
which, initially in the case law, and now in the Treaties, are deemed to derive from the 
‘common constitutional traditions’ of the member states, the ECJ has equipped itself with a 
number of non-textual lodestars—fundamental rights, equality, proportionality, legal 
certainty, effectiveness etc.57 In a “synthetic”58 process, these ideas, while their national 
origins are never disowned, are gradually refined so as to acquire distinct significance as 
doctrines of supranational law. In this way, the EU legal order seeks to garner the normative 
resources necessary to address hard questions raised by its gradually-expanding jurisdiction; 
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54 See e.g. Weiler n6 above, ch.2. 
55 See Section 3B . 
56 Art. 6(1) TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
57 See e.g., T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (2nd ed., 2006). 
58 John Erik Fossum and Agustin Jose Menendez, The Constitution’s Gift: A Constitutional Theory for a 
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both the need to construe new areas of law for which there are no existing thick interpretive 
practices and the imperative to do so in a manner that strives for internal consistency and 
coherence across an increasingly wide range of functional objectives and core values.59 As 
with the jurisdictional sub-register, the dynamic of constitutionalism in this sub-register is 
incremental, mapping a gradual movement away from the ‘thin’ end of the constitutional 
spectrum. 
 
(iv) The institutional register  
Patently, the EU from the outset has boasted its own specialized and closely defined 
institutional structure as both product and mobilizing force of its legal order. In particular, 
through a dedicated Court (ECJ) administrative college (Commission) and legislator 
(Council), the founding scheme supplied a more elaborately differentiated and strongly 
empowered institutional complex than possessed by other international Treaty 
organizations.60 What is more, in terms of the range and depth of institutions and the density 
of their relations, today the EU’s political system has evolved and matured far beyond that 
early structure. Yet we should be wary of overstating similarities between the supranational 
and the state architecture. To recall our earlier discussion, it is in this institutional sub-register 
that he distinctiveness of EU as a mixed or composite polity becomes evident. Whereas the 
primary axis of institutional division within the state polity is the governmental branch and 
function—legislative, executive or judicial—for one and the same polity object, the EU 
system has no such single centre of gravity. Its key axis of institutional division, instead, is 
the representation, in functionally overlapping form, of separate ‘estates’61 and interests, 
which constituencies refer back to diverse polity sources, or at least, diverse conception of 
the Euro-polity. Traditionally, the European Commission and the European Court of Justice 
reflect the supranational interest, the ‘intergovernmental’ Council and the European Council 
(of Heads of States) refer back to the separate interests of the state polities, while the 
European Parliament refers, ambiguously, to the representation of the European ‘peoples’ 
(national) or ‘people’ (supranational). Rather than the separation of (types of governmental) 
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60 See e.g. Paul Craig, “Institutions, Powers and Institutional Balance” in P. Craig and G. De Burca (eds) The 
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powers, therefore, the key structural imperative of the mixed constitutional polity is more 
closely modelled on a dispersed, pre- state conception of institutional balance.62 
Just because of the background diversity of interests, however, that balance has 
tended to be a contested one, and also increasingly complex. The initial technocratic 
disposition in pursuit of the common market—‘the Commission proposes, the Council 
disposes’—lasted only until the shift under the transitional provisions of the initial Treaty 
from unanimity to qualified majority voting in the Council threatened the retention of 
ultimate national control over the legislative process. This led to the so-called ‘empty chair’ 
crisis in the Council, provoked by French President de Gaulle and only resolved by the 1966 
Luxembourg Compromise, which provided that decisional unanimity would continue where 
important national interests were at stake. This led to a long consolidation of national 
executive hegemony over new macro-policy initiatives, reflected in the gradually increasing 
prominence of the European Council63 and in an extended period of legislative immobility 
not overcome until a series of Treaty initiatives beginning with the Single European Act 
(1987) and continuing with the Treaties of Maastricht (1992) and Amsterdam (1997). These 
measures relaxed the national veto by introducing qualified majority voting in the Council, 
first in the area of internal market law and then more broadly. At the same time, direct 
national executive influence was further diluted by the increasing recognition of the 
European Parliament as a third proactive player in the legislative process, first through the 
cooperation procedure and then through the stronger co-decision procedure.  
 The easing of legislative deadlock and the emerging policy-making tripartitism, 
however, far from resolves all questions of institutional balance. One regular battleground of 
the last two decades has been the compositional and internal decision-making rules of the key 
institutional players. Another has been the division of ‘sub-legislative’ executive and 
regulatory authority between Commission and Council in more detailed areas of policy. In 
both arenas, the tensions of a composite polity remain vividly present.64 
B. The Strengths and Limitation of Thin Constitutionalism  
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63 Despite having been informally established at the Paris summit of 1974, it was not accorded Treaty 
recognition until the Single European Act of 1987. 
64 See Craig, note 60 above; see also G De Burca and J. Scott (eds) Law and New Governance in the European 
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(i) the centrality of law 
Understandings of the manner in which the ingredients of thin constitutionalism—formal, 
jurisdictional, integrative and political-institutional—combine, vary in emphasis, but all 
versions of the “grand narrative”65 have in common the idea of law performing a vital and 
well-tailored role in the construction and sustenance of the EU polity. The centrality of law to 
the emergent constitutional settlement rests on a number of considerations—instrumental, 
structural, ideological, anthropological and, most fundamentally, philosophical. Let us look 
briefly at each. 
The instrumental dimension concerns the indispensability of law as the basic motor of 
supranationalism—the key means to the end of European integration. Writing in the early 
1980s, before the gradual development of qualified majority voting and the pronounced 
expansion of jurisdiction beyond the market-making core, Joseph Weiler drew attention to 
the “the dual character of supranationalism” 66 as the defining frame of Europe’s early 
evolution. At that stage, the developed character of legal or normative supranationalism in the 
core area of the internal market, particularly the ECJ’s assertive development of the formal 
properties of the EU as an autonomous legal system, stood in stark contrast to a modestly 
conceived decisional or political supranationalism. Yet the two were strategically related. The 
early prominence of legal supranationalism occurred not in spite of political 
underdevelopment but precisely because political supranationalism remained so modest, with 
the member states retaining a de jure or de facto veto power in most areas of European 
policy-making. The most basic key to the attractiveness of law as the vehicle of supranational 
agency, therefore, lay with its regulatory capacity to steer, to consolidate and, typically 
through judicial recognition of the claims of private litigants, to guarantee positive-sum 
intergovernmental bargains across wide-ranging aspects of economic integration and some 
more limited aspects of market-correcting regulation, and to do so without threatening key 
national political prerogatives. The law’s instrumental value was twofold. It provided a 
legible and stable method of charting and co-coordinating the supranational settlement. 
Additionally, in a context of market-making where the temptation for each national member 
of the continental trade-liberalizing cartel to engage in protectionism and other forms of 
discrimination while exploiting the general opening of the markets of the other national 
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members posed a significant collective action problem, the consistent application and 
enforcement of the rules of the game by independent legal institutions was crucial in 
forestalling free-riding and rendering common commitments more credible.67 
Structural factors reinforce the instrumental attractiveness of law. The empowerment 
of the ECJ as the apex court responded to a conception of the constitutional settlement 
understood, in the language of organizational economics, as an incomplete contract. 
Framework texts, even the relatively detailed codes of successive European Treaties, always 
allow a degree of open texture. In so doing they both lower the bar of prerequisite consensus 
and, by facilitating agreement at the drafting stage, allow judicial adaptation of the text to 
changing conditions without new resort to the drawing board. The resulting margin of 
judicial manoeuvre is key to reconciling stability and flexibility in any constitutional context; 
all the more so in the EU, where the political conditions for regular textual reform, certainly 
over the first quarter century of the Union, were highly unfavourable. The ECJ, then, became 
a vital mechanism to avoid blockages and conflicts associated with the divergence and 
conflict of national political interests. As a “trustee court”,68 delegated significant power to 
bind its national principals and able through development of its formal constitutional 
attributes to fortify and expand its zone of discretion, it could approach the task of 
‘completing’ the supranational contract both by advancing the material agenda of integration 
case-by-case and by adjusting the balance, so sensitive in the mixed polity context, in 
boundary conflicts over the powers of the diversely-sourced institutions.69 
The fiduciary role of a trustee court, however, is not legitimated solely through 
considerations of system functionality. Ideological factors also matter. The tradition of legal 
formalism, assiduously cultivated in the context of an ECJ composed of senior jurists from all 
member states and conducting its business in a typically laconic and scrupulously non-
partisan ‘legalese’, has lent cumulative authority to the court’s decision-making.70 The fact 
that much of the constitutional jurisdiction of the EU and its judicial organs could be 
articulated in terms of rights—both its positive jurisdiction, and, with increasing emphasis, its 
negative jurisdiction, has reinforced this ideological advantage. It has meant that the ECJ 
could engage in a constitutional vein in terms closely associated with its own authority as a 
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court—in the language of individual rights and remedies so familiar from the historical 
lexicon of constitutional law.71 
Underpinning these instrumental, structural and ideological considerations, there is a 
strong cultural dimension. A recent body of anthropological research has underlined just how 
important the original network of elite supranational actors in and around the ECJ was in 
developing the theme of “Europeanization through case-law”.72 Not only did the key 
formative decisions on supremacy and direct effect take place in acknowledgment of and 
response to the difficulties associated with political integration, but they involved a conscious 
and self-reinforcing mobilization of the very notion of the supranational community as a 
community of law. Rather than thinking of law-centred theories of integration as purely 
external and retrospective accounts of a secular process, therefore, we should also understand 
them as active structuring devices, as means by which judges, civil servants, academics, 
MEPS, national diplomats and Commissioners became engaged ‘in real time’ in a “circular 
circulation of ideas”73 which contributed in a cumulative manner to the ascendancy of legal 
constitutionalism. 
 If the assertion of such a robust legal persona has been the key to the capacity of the 
EU operating from its narrow stronghold of institutional power to exercise continental 
regulatory authority, its success at root depends upon its resonance with many of the earlier 
philosophical justifications of the EU. In their different ways, two of the most influential of 
the early grand theories of integration, the German ordoliberal tradition74 and Hans Ipsen’s 
idea of the EU as a special purpose association,75 encouraged a law-centred perspective. For 
the ordoliberals, the Treaty of Rome supplied Europe with its own economic constitution, a 
supranational market–enhancing system of rights whose legitimacy required the absence of 
democratically responsive will formation and consequential pressure towards market-
interfering socio-economic legislation at the supranational level, a matter best left instead to 
the member states—and even there only insofar as compatible with the bedrock economic 
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constitution. Ordoliberal theory, then, provides a classic model of how an autonomous legal 
order, through generating and ring-fencing a framework of economic exchange centred on the 
four freedoms, provides a platform for the efficient operation of a capitalist economic logic 
. Ipsen’s theory, to which Giandomenico Majone’s contemporary work on the idea of a 
European “regulatory state”76 is a notable successor, shares with ordoliberalism the idea that 
supranationalism should transcend partisan politics. Here, however, the ambit of law is 
extended so that the invisible hand of the market is supplemented by the expert hand of the 
technocrat. In Majone’s elaborately developed conception—one that has continued to capture 
the sensibility of a significant part of the Brussels elite—these additional regulatory measures 
are concerned not with macro-politically sensitive questions of distribution, but with risk-
regulation in matters such as product and environmental standards where expert knowledge is 
deemed paramount, and where accountability, it is argued, is best served by administrative 
law measures aimed at transparency and enhanced participation in decision-making by 
interested and knowledgeable parties rather than the volatile preferences of broad 
representative institutions. 
 
(ii) The exhaustion of the legal paradigm 
The delicate balance achieved by locking the EU’s collective agency within a law-centred 
discourse and a narrow market-based justification could not, however, hold indefinitely. The 
pursuit and perfection of the narrow economic objectives of the Union has progressively 
impinged upon a wide range of social issues, making “spillover”77 into politically contentious 
areas of traditionally national jurisdiction inevitable. Both ordoliberal and regulatory state 
approaches, in consequence, have become increasingly vulnerable to the charge of drawing 
artificial distinctions between technical questions of market-making and standard-setting and 
deeply contested questions of value preference and transnational resource and risk 
allocation.78  
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Such a tension was in truth present from the very birth of supranationalism. Economic 
policies always carried significant implications, whether supportive or restrictive, for wider 
political projects and ambitions at the national or supranational level. Importantly, indeed, it 
was a powerfully supportive nexus between the economic and political which from the 
beginning allowed the common market to be elevated to the defining supranational priority 
not just on wealth-maximizing grounds. Just as important was the wider political prize of 
lasting peace for a continent long blighted by war that a culture of economic co-operation and 
shared affluence could help secure.79 Less felicitous connections between the narrow 
economic and wider political poles of integration, however, became more evident as the EU 
increasingly sought market-making or market–correcting interventions involving politically 
salient choices, in so doing reducing the capacity of states to act independently in these 
policy areas. The robust juridical elaboration and protection of the single market which lay at 
the heart of legal constitutionalism had flourished in a formative context where market-
making measures impinged only lightly on other social policy objectives, or at least where 
states retained the procedural means to veto politically controversial collective commitments 
in pursuit of these other objectives—and so were slow to make such commitments in 
situations where there were obvious winners and losers. But the gradual expansion of the 
scope of negative integration from the narrow market-making sphere and the concomitant 
growth of positive integration, with its shift towards a qualified majoritarian logic, decisively 
changed the dynamic of collective action. 
 The gathering danger has been that the very strength of the law in supplying “both the 
object and agent of integration.”80—in providing the main fruit of the ‘thin’ constitutional 
settlement as well as the channel for arriving at that settlement, would become a liability. On 
the one hand, as the agent of integration, the law threatened to become a medium whose 
prudent husbanding of the integration acquis would instead translate as excessive political 
unresponsiveness. The threat was that the legal proofing of particular agreements against 
political reappraisal and the prevention of new supranational initiatives except through still 
highly consensual and only moderately democratically inclusive procedures, or through the 
recondite increments of the ECJ, would become more a way of avoiding or excluding the 
legitimate expression of political choice and contestation and less a means of protection 
against free-riding or against ideologically inspired resistance or fickleness towards positive-
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sum collective commitments. On the other hand, where the pressure towards positive 
integration has lead to legal change, and as more and more controversial value choices have 
begun to be reflected onto the legal domain—this has also affected the ideological potency of 
law as the object of integration, stripping some of the detached, efficiency-maximizing 
veneer from legal supranationalism. 81 
 
4. The Future of the Unresolved Constitution 
 
The gradual fraying of the “permissive consensus”82 around the idea of legal 
supranationalism sets the deep context within which the big ‘C’ constitutional debate 
emerged. Other factors contributed, notably the wave of eastward Enlargement after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall. The increase in the size of the EU from 15 members in 1997 to 27 in 2007 
raised acute questions about the adequacy of an institutional structure initially built for a 
homogenous western European club of six states to a sprawling pan-European expanse of 500 
million persons. Indeed, Enlargement and its unmet institutional needs provided an important 
rhetorical framework for the EU’s decade of reform. It was the thread that connected the busy 
sequence of Treaties reforms from Maastricht to Nice in 2001, whose unfinished business in 
turn led to the historic decision at the Laeken summit to establish a Convention on the Future 
of Europe. 83 Yet the focus on Enlargement merely channelled and accelerated a process of 
reflection and contestation over the kind of polity the EU was and could become that was 
unavoidable in light of the increasing inadequacy of the received model.  
In the introduction it was suggested that three polity visions accompanied the big ‘C’ 
constitutional debate, and each can be seen as a response to the gradual extension of 
supranational capacity and competence beyond what could comfortably be accommodated in 
the earlier model. The truncated vision, first, was one of retrenchment. It was concerned to 
draw a line in the sand by resort to mechanisms such as a competence catalogue, the 
entrenchment of the Charter of Rights and the empowerment of national Parliaments, with 
constitutionalism here invoked both materially and symbolically as a limiting device to 
ensure against the further evacuation of state power to the supranational level.84 The sui 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 See e.g. Weiler note 6 above, ch.2. 
82 See e.g. Lisbet Hooghe and Gary Marks “ A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From 
Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus” (2008) 39 British Journal of Political Science 1-23. 
83 See e.g. Neil Walker, “Constitutionalising Enlargement, Enlarging Constitutionalism” (2003) 9 European 
Law Journal 365-85 
84 Tellingly, each of these measures were central to the original post-Nice “leftovers” agenda which triggered 
the Laeken summit and the Convention on the Future of Europe, see Walker, n7 above  
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generis vision, secondly, was concerned with pursuing or consolidating Europe’s 
Sonderweg.85 Its defining priority was not the protection of state prerogatives, but ensuring 
against the kind of political blockage and institutional stasis which would prevent Europe 
from making the governance adjustments necessary for its distinctive ‘post-national’ 
accommodations between market and state, intergovernmental and supranational, legal fixity 
and political openness to be maintained and updated. In its pragmatic attention to the 
demands of a novel problem-solving context and in its non-alignment with ‘old’ state-
sovereigntist coded oppositions, this view was the quiet motor of much of the pro-
Convention movement. Constitutionalism here assumed importance less for its material 
content and more as way of re-energizing and re-validating a macro-political reform process 
which, given the progressive disappointments and deferrals of the Amsterdam and Nice 
Treaties, was falling foul of the law of diminishing returns.86  
The mature polity vision, thirdly, hoped to bring the benefits of thick 
constitutionalism to bear on the Europolity. It sought that the EU constitution, through a 
combination of inclusive process, integrative content and culturally unifying symbolic 
product, could deliver some kind of functional equivalent to the peaks of comprehensive 
jurisdiction, self-authorization, and deeper political identity. In this way, the “asymmetry”87 
of a settlement in which the EU lacked the joint political resources to deliver legitimate and 
effective collective solutions to politically and intergovernmentally contentious issues of 
economic and social policy that increasingly fell outside the independent capability of 
national governments, might be overcome. This third vision may not have been the most 
commonly endorsed approach feeding the Convention momentum, but it was undoubtedly 
the most heavily invested in the big ‘C’ solution. Importantly, for the most part88 it did not 
envisage the EU as a federal state, so acknowledging the concerns of the state-centred 
constitutionalists. It did not, in other words, seek to replace the states as the single point of 
final authority, original collective agency and deep political identity within the European 
domain. Rather, the third vision sought to develop or recognize these state-familiar 
constitutional assets of political community on an independent footing for the EU, and in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Weiler, n10 above. 
86 See e.g. Joseph Weiler, “One the Power of the Word: Europe’s Constitutional Iconography” (2005) 3 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 173-190; B. De Witte “The Closest Thing to a Constitutional 
Conversation in Europe: The Semi-Permanent Treaty Revision Process” in P. Beaumont, C. Lyons and N. 
Walker (eds) Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law , (2002) 39-57. 
87 Scharpf, note 71 above.  
88 On Europe as a federal state, see F. Mancini, “Europe: The Case for Statehood” (1998) 4 European Law 
Journal 29-42. 
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manner that envisaged neither superiority nor subordination to the states but engagement in a 
non-hierarchical relationship with them. So the EU would have a basis of authority that was 
autonomous without being exclusive or exhaustive. It would have a foundation and reference 
point of collective agency (i.e. the European people) that was distinctive and self-standing 
without being the only such distinctive and self-standing point of reference for the various 
constituencies (i.e., European states, European ‘peoples’) which made up the new collective 
agency. Finally, and building on the formal supranational citizenship provisions in place 
since Maastricht,89 it would also possess a form of framing or organizing political identity, 
complete with rights, obligations and membership status, which was again distinctive but not 
unique in this function, instead operating in tandem with the other (predominantly state-
centred) organizing political identities of its subjects.90 
 Given the disparity of visions brought to the table, it is no surprise that the big ‘C’ 
constitutional initiative failed. Here we see the unresolved quality of the EU Constitution in 
bold and sustained relief. The very conditions of competitiveness, mixity and indeterminacy 
that encouraged the initiative also generated the open horizon of alternatives and the intensity 
of disputation which invited its failure. Should this, then, lead us to conclude, especially in 
the light of the successful implementation of the subsequent Reform Treaty, that the idea of 
big ‘C’ constitutionalism in the EU is a dead letter, its resurrection neither feasible nor 
desirable? Whatever the future trajectory of supranational constitutionalism, ought it not now 
revert to some variation of the informal, small ‘c’ course around whose historical credentials 
and continuing contribution there has recently emerged such a clamorous overlapping 
consensus? 
We should not draw such a hasty conclusion. The wider constitutional debate may be 
in abeyance, but it is not resolved and cannot be while its animating polity visions remain so 
deeply at odds with one another, and where the symptoms of that deep fracture in the dearth 
of common terms of engagement over key choices and strategic directions in both European 
domestic and foreign policy in the early decades of the new century remain so pertinent and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 See now, Arts. 20-25 TFEU. 
 
90 See e.g. Weiler note 6 above, ch.10.  
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pressing.91 In these circumstances, unlikely as its immediate prospects may be, a revival of 
the big ‘C’ Constitutional project cannot and should not be discounted.  
 But even if this were to happen, the sceptic might dismiss it as a futile gesture, one 
trapped in a self-defeating logic of contestation. There is no guarantee that the process, 
whatever its initial momentum, would be any more successfully negotiated next time round. 
And even if it were to be, this would provide no magic solution to the problems of the mutual 
frustration and overall dilution of collective capability in a multi-level political space which, 
quite differently conceived and articulated, exercise the exponents of all three visions. In 
particular, a successful constitutional episode would supply no compelling case in favour of 
the third and most optimistically positive-sum vision to those who would rather promote 
supranational capability in other ways (second vision) or concentrate on protecting or 
resurrecting national capability (first vision). For, as has been forcefully pointed out, a 
successful constitutional process offers no copper-bottomed guarantee of more inclusive 
ongoing participation, no deliberative panacea and no promise of increased support by its 
citizens or effective policy-making and implementation capacity even to the extent that any 
such participatory and deliberative dividends may be forthcoming.92  
Yet the specification of a distinctive collective authorship and political identity that 
the constitutional self-attribution of title announces could serve another more limited but 
prior purpose. This concerns the realization of the very sense of collective pre-engagement in 
whose absence it is difficult to see how any attempt to reconcile polity visions in the 
European legal and political space, regardless of where and how these attempts strike the 
balance—can be securely grounded. For the constitutional arena—and perhaps only the 
constitutional arena, offers the possibility that, as we bring down the curtain on an era that 
allowed first-order economic decision-making to proceed and its benefits to accrue 
substantially unaffected by second-order considerations of what and who the EU stood for 
other than a legally demarcated set of interests delegated by the constituent states, we might 
at least begin the process of overcoming increasingly disabling second-order differences over 
the basic character of the EU polity in and through the very act of recognizing and addressing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 The sovereign debt crisis of 2011, and the failures of supranational policy-making in the context of the 
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92 Perhaps most effectively, and most trenchantly, by A. Moravcsik, see e.g. his “ What Can We Learn from the 
Collapse of the European Constitutional Project? (2006) 47 Politische Vierteljahresschrift 2 ; K.H. Ladeur “We, 
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such differences as our common predicament. More specifically, such a documentary 
constitutional commitment may, in a boot-strapping fashion, supply the platform for the 
generation of a reflexive awareness of a common sense of authorship over time and for the 
gradual accumulation of a common constitutional experience that deepens and consolidates 
that common sense.93  
And while it would be wrong to see this as any more than one modest element in the 
remaking of the European polity along lines which command broader acceptance, we should 
not fall in to the opposite error of underestimating its importance. A written Constitution is 
always both trace and catalyst. It is a trace because its very promulgation is already a sign, 
however modest, of the commitment and common understanding it seeks to encode. And the 
Constitution is also a catalyst insofar as it provides a means by which and a context in which 
to stimulate the deepening of that commitment and common understanding. Indeed, it is 
precisely this Janus-faced quality—the backward-looking recollection of common resources 
and gathering of existing potential just in order to solve forward-looking collective action 
problems amongst those of different interest, preferences and identities—that has given 
documentary constitutionalism its uniquely modern hue. For in its assumption that nothing is 
more basic or more apt than our own joint commitment to shape our common world, 
constitutionalism invokes a social technology unknown to pre-modern cultures. Perseverance 
with the techniques of documentary constitutionalism, then, may be unavoidable for anyone 
who wishes to maintain that the EU is best understood as a continuation by other and as yet 
‘unresolved’ means of political modernity’s defining project of the collective reconciliation 
of freedom and equality, rather than a venture into a wholly uncharted political imaginary.  
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